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PART 2 “The Attack” – THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

 PART 2 “The Attack”   THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

Last year Aamir Lakhani and Joseph Muniz developed a fake identity known as Emily Williams with the purpose of compromising a specific target using social media. We created Emily Williams based on research from Robin Sage, which showcased how a fake identity could obtain sensitive information from social media resources. We wondered if a similar approach could be used for targeted attacks and developed Emily Williams for that purpose. More information on developing Emily Williams via Part 1 of this project can be found HERE.emily1 new PART 2 “The Attack”   THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

Emily Williams and Robin Sage

This Part 2 post explains WHY the Emily Williams project is important to understand. Yes, it was humorous watching people endorse a fake person’s technical abilities and receive job offers based on a posted IT background (or possibly just because Emily is attractive) however those are not the worst outcomes from social media threats. Part 1 concluded with our lovely Emily Williams having friends with multiple parties from our target such as Human Resources, IT Support, Engineering and Executive Leadership. People were sharing information and considering Emily Williams an employee based on the profile we created. The information alone was very valuable however that was just the beginning.

Stage 3 focused on obtaining access to host systems through social media. There are many options to do this such as the very popular Blackhole exploit kit however we did not want to use any method that could potentially harm our target’s system based on personal ethics. Blackhole is the most prevalent web threat seen today leveraging a malicious payload that we felt wasn’t safe for our target’s systems. We chose to use The Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) based on our feeling that compromising browsers was not as evil as using malware.

blackhole PART 2 “The Attack”   THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target 

Blackhole Exploit Kit Screenshot

BeEF 2 PART 2 “The Attack”   THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) Screenshot 

BeEF leverages browser vulnerabilities to assess the security posture of a target. BeEF “hooks” targets as beachheads for launching direct command modules.  Different browsers have various vulnerabilities, which means the more vulnerable a browser is, the more unique attack vectors become available to the hacker. We installed Backtrack 5R3 on a server and developed a BeEF hooking server that was public facing. We tested systems by accessing our BeEF server, hooking systems and launched commands such as taking a screen shot capture. More on building a BeEF system can be found HERE.

The next step was luring employees of the target to our BeEF system. There are many methods hackers accomplish this such as offering free media sites (IE download music, movies, etc. … see more on why this is risky behavior HERE), phishing emails and fake URLs designed to look and feel like something else. We decided to post virtual holiday cards on Emily William’s social media pages and direct invites to specific targets. The goal was having a user click the holiday card, wait for the card to pop up and have our system probe the browser for vulnerabilities during the waiting period. Once we hooked the target, we would look for passwords and insider information to gain access to the target agency. We launched three campaigns targeting systems during Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years. We were able to figure out domain credentials to create an inside email address for Emily Williams, VPN passwords to gain internal access and other methods to compromise our target.Screen Shot 2013 02 19 at 10.03.57 AM PART 2 “The Attack”   THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

Our research demonstrated a few points. First off, people are trusting and male dominated industries like IT are even more trusting of women. Second, social media can be used as a means to compromise targets if users are not educated on common attacks and proper use of public facing network resources. The risk extends beyond data leakage since many people that use social media also use the same systems for internal use while at work. Finally, we demonstrated how easy it is to carry out what many consider an advanced persistent threat (APT) meaning we chose our target and bypassed standard security technology. We believe our methods were not very sophisticated compared to the real threats that target people using today’s public Internet yet we were very successful with our goal of compromising a specific target. Security is an extremely important investment and needs to include education around proper use of social media (more on this HERE) as well as protection from insider threats.

I hate to drop a plug however I recently took a job at Lancope based on their technologies’ ability to detect insider threats. 

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THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

Disclaimer: This post has been modified to exclude specific subjects not approved for public viewing


emily1 new THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

Emily Williams and Robin Sage

Emily Williams and Robin Sage don’t exist in the real world. They are fake social network accounts designed to obtain sensitive information. Robin Sage was created in late 2009 to obtain information from intelligence on US military personnel. Her story was presented at the Black Hat hacker conference upsetting many people by exposing the type of sensitive data provided over social networks. Joey Muniz and Aamir Lakhani decided to go one-step further and ask the hard question: “what else can happen outside of data being leaked over social networks”. We decided to find out using Emily Williams.

NOTE: The research presented is real. Many people reading this are friends with Emily and probably mad at us. We have informed anybody attacked so if you haven’t heard from us, you are just social network friends with Emily.

 

emily2 new THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

Emily’s Real Employer 

Emily Williams was created in November 2011 for Facebook and LinkedIn. Our goal was to pick a specific target and see how far we could penetrate the target using social networks as the entry point for infiltration. The plan was to build up a social network with key personal and launch attacks from Facebook and LinkedIn that compromised systems using social networks. From there, we could gain entry into the network and more or less capture the flag. The research was made public with the goal of educating employees about security around social networks as well as the current potential threats that could target people like you. We had executive approval before conducting the experiment.

Social Network Findings

The first step was creating the Facebook and LinkedIn accounts. We found a non technical female employee from the restaurant industry (that happened to be a few blocks from our target) to volunteer pictures for Emily’s appearance. We developed a fake social security number, residence and other areas that may be searched to make Emily seem real. We gave Emily an IT background from the University of Texas and updated her profile with a matching employment background.

 

emily3 new THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

 Social Engineer Using Facebook Profile Info

 

conversation3 THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

User Flags Emily

Step two was building up friends prior to networking with our target audience. We decided to pick on Joey Muniz’s friends figuring if they flagged her as fake, they wouldn’t inform anybody from our target audience. Within hours we had over 100 friends using manual adding methods. We found very little resistance to accepting her as a friend however one individual not only denied her friend request but also posted to his friends a warning about Emily without actually calling her out. Another funny story was a friend ask “Do I know you?” and by simply replying with information from his social profile, we had him say he remember her. The lesson learned is think about what you post because it could be used against you!

job2 THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

Job Offer Based On Profile Info

Once we had a decent number of friends, we updated her status as a new employee to our target with a technical engineering title. From there, we start adding potential targets starting with sales and mid level technical staff as well as our partners with the target. We not only grew our friends from the organizations, we also started receiving job offers, meeting requests and congratulations on the new job with our target. As our target audience friend number grew, we started moving up the rank eventually capturing people from Human Resources and Engineering who would be responsible for hiring Emily if she existed. We moved all the way up to executive leadership and happy to say our President denied her friend request based on looking for her name is the corporate directory. We have a lot of respect for his diligence.

endorse THE SOCIAL MEDIA DECEPTION PROJECT : How We Created Emily Williams To Compromise Our Target

Can You Trust LinkedIn Endorsing?

At this point we have networked with our target audience and have enough key members linked to perform attacks. Part 2 of this story will feature how we leveraged the social network to obtain access to the network. Consider part 2 the answer to WHY Robin Sage and Emily Williams are a risk for organizations. Stay tuned for part two and again for those involved, don’t worry we didn’t do anything bad to you unless we told you. Oh and thanks for helping us prove our point about the dangers of social networks!

Article written and research conducted by:

Joey Muniz

Blog: www.thesecurityblogger.com

Aamir Lakhani

Blog: www.cloudcentrics.com

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Penetration Testing Tools At Your Next Security Conference – WIFI Pineapple Mark III

pineapple 942x1024 Penetration Testing Tools At Your Next Security Conference – WIFI Pineapple Mark IIIToday’s highlight – WIFI Pineapple Mark III Wireless Penetration Testing Tool.

There are many cool tools sold at conferences. One tool to check out is the WIFI Pineapple Mark III for around $100 dollars. Basically it’s a wireless honeypot using a man-in-the-middle attack to access data. The way it works is it listens for devices calling out for known wireless networks / SSIDs. The WIFI Pineapple will hear the request and clone the requested SSID so the device believes its connecting to a known trusted network.

photo1 1024x768 Penetration Testing Tools At Your Next Security Conference – WIFI Pineapple Mark IIIAn example is connecting an iPad on an airplane to the online network GOGO SSID. Some time later the user may be at a Starbucks and turn on the iPad that was used on the airplane. The iPad will beacon out “am I still on the airplane and can I re-connect to GOGO?”. The WIFI Pineapple will hear the request and reply back  “I’m GOGO … welcome to the internet”. The iPad will auto-connect to the fake GOGO SSID without re-authenticating, which is really the WIFI Pineapple passing traffic through to another network while the hacker sits in the middle. Essentially, the WIFI Pineapple takes advantage of convenience services via auto connecting to known or trusted networks offered by most wireless devices.

The WIFI Pineapple is pretty easy to setup. It has two LAN interfaces (pass through and admin access). It provides auto DHCP 172.16.42.X to the administrative interface. To access the main interface, a GUI located at 172.16.42.1. From here, the pen tester can enable many tools as well as see who is connecting to the WIFI Pineapple. Network setup is pretty easy and designed to pass traffic through without systems knowing the difference from the fake SSID or real network.

Screen Shot 2012 02 07 at 11.41.00 PM Penetration Testing Tools At Your Next Security Conference – WIFI Pineapple Mark IIISome built in tool highlights (in the release of software I’m running) are Karma, Snarf and DNS Spoofing. The GUI is pretty easy to get around. I used the WIFI Pineapple to capture cookies and replay in FireFox via the Add N Edit Cookies plugin. An example is capturing a Facebook cookie to accessing the victim’s Facebook account. An example of using cookies to access a gmail account can be found HERE regarding the cookie reply process.

For those wondering how to defend against this tool there are some options. VPN tunnels encrypt traffic from your device to its destination blocking visibility into traffic seen by the WIFE Pineapple (example using Anyconnect by Cisco). Also using data in motion / encryption technology for sensitive data will defend against this attack since the users must be authenticated to access the data contents that are captured by the man-in-the-middle. Disabling auto-connecting to networks may mean extra steps to establish network connectivity however will help in scenarios like this. The bad part about this attack is you may not auto-connect to known risky networks such as Starbucks however the WIFI Pineapple can clone any SSID including your home network.

Check out Hak5 for more details on this and other cool tools.

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Locks Keep the Honest People Out: How the Bad Guys Break In | lock picking.

People lock their doors at night and feel protected from criminals. The scary thing most people are not aware of is locks are easy to bypass with inexpensive tools. You may think these tools are hard to obtain however I watch lock pick kits sellout at security conferences each year with attendance in the thousands. If you search the Internet for terms like “lock picking, bump keys or impressioning” you’ll find hundreds of results including video tutorials. It’s not hard for criminals to break into doors and safes. In most cases, they can do it in under a minute without leaving behind evidence the average users will notice.

Inside a common lock
inside lock 300x250 Locks Keep the Honest People Out: How the Bad Guys Break In | lock picking.
The first thing you should understand is the basic concept of most locks. Common door locks contain components that sit out of line until a key is inserted. Once the components are lined up, the lock can be opened. Most lock picking tools use two tools to bypass this system. One tool applies tension to the lock while the second tool moves the plug, bolt or other components into position. Once the attacker properly positions the components the lock can be opened.

Picture of two lock picking tools I purchased at a conference for under $20
photo 1 300x224 Locks Keep the Honest People Out: How the Bad Guys Break In | lock picking.
Another way attackers could bypass a common pin-tumbler lock is using a bump key. The concept uses a modified key that has cuts at their lowest depths. Attackers use a bump hammer on the inserted key by lightly tapping and applying tension. This causes kinetic energy to travel from the key to the top pins causing these pins to jump. If all top pins jump above the shear-line, the lock will open. I’ve gotten this to work with the back of a rubber screwdriver handle but it took lots of attempts.

Picture of bump keys I picked up for under $20 dollars.
photo 300x224 Locks Keep the Honest People Out: How the Bad Guys Break In | lock picking.
Impressioning is a way to develop a permanent working key. One way this could be done is using a blank key by inserting it into a lock and applying lots of torque. The lock’s pins will leave marks on the blank key giving away their positions. The attacker can file down those locations and continue the process until the key opens the lock. This may sound time consuming however a German speaker at the 2011 Defcon conference opened an average lock using this technique in 30 seconds. Blank keys for common locks can be purchased in bulk for very little.

There are more professional ways to beat locks such as using pin guns, molding or bypassing the lock (IE using the old credit card) that I’m not covering. Many enthuses consider lock picking a hobby where locks are like puzzles to be beaten and understood. I’m not skilled in this art yet with cheap tools have opened locks at conference and other approved locations. Your best bet is to continue to use locks along with a detection defense such as an alarm or surveillance system. My neighbor relies on his dog and shotgun, which is just as effective.

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